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Antitrust and Communications Policy:




As this article goes to press, Apple has just announced that it had ac-
cepted the Google Voice application to the App Store, which is a small step
in the right direction. Although this article centered around Apple's alleged
denial of the Google Voice application, this article used the alleged denial as
a case study to address broader issues of technology and business policies.
In particular, in light of the recent class action certification in federal court
of In re Apple & ATTM Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05152, 2010 WL 3521965
(N.D.C.A. July 8, 2010), this article is timely because it provides an analysis
of Apple and AT&T's business practices and how they intersect with U.S.
antitrust and communications law. This article also analyzes these broad
issues through the lens of net neutrality.
I. INTRODUCTION
There's an app for just about everything'-but not Google Voice.
The world has changed considerably since the Federal Communications
Commission2 (FCC) allocated spectrum to mobile telephony in 1968.3 In
SSRN author page http://ssm.com/author=-1479355. This Article was the cul-
mination of multiple courses in antitrust, communications and intellectual prop-
erty law overseen by Professors Catherine J. K. Sandoval and Allen S.
Hammond IV while the author was a student at Santa Clara University School
of Law. The author is grateful to Professors Sandoval and Hammond for their
invaluable guidance in the preparation and refinement of this Article.
Special thanks to QuynhChi P. Nguyen for her comments on this Article.
I. Apple iPhone Gallery - TV Ads, http://www.apple.com/iphone/gallery/ads/#
avid-large (last visited Nov. 3, 2010); See Apple - iPhone, Over 250,000 ways
to make iPhone even better, http://www.apple.com/iphone/apps-for-iphone/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
2. The Federal Communications Commission [hereinafter FCC] is an independent
government agency in the United States. It was established by the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.§ 151 et seq., which grants the Commission power
to regulate interstate and international radio, television, wire, wireless, satellite
and cable communications. FCC, About the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
3. See An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency band 806-960
MHz; and Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91 and 93 of the Rules
Relative to Operations in the Land Mobile Service Between 806 and 960 MHz,
Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Docket No. 18262, 14
F.C.C.2d 311 (F.C.C. 1968).
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1981, the FCC authorized the first commercial cellular networks. 4 Today,
there are more than 200 million mobile telephone subscribers nationwide.5
In recent years, the number of wireless phone subscribers has surpassed the
number of traditional wireline subscribers by more than 100 million individ-
uals. 6 For many Americans, a mobile phone has become as necessary as a
wallet or a set of keys.7 Consumers are now using their mobile phones for
more than making telephone calls. They rely on numerous applications to
perform tasks such as finding the closest Mongolian barbeque restaurant, 8
tracking a golf game using global positioning (GPS),9 or learning what song
is playing on the radio.0
As a result, the demand for aftermarket mobile phone applications has
exploded.,I For example, Apple Inc. sells a mobile phone called the iPhone
which allows users to install aftermarket applications from Apple's online
marketplace called the App Store.12 Since its opening,13 the Apple App Store
4. See An Inquiry Into the Use of Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Commc'ns Sys.; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Comm'n's
Rules Relative to Cellular, Report and Order, CC Docket No. 79-318, FCC 81-
161,Commc'ns Sys., 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (F.C.C. 1981).
5. Annual Report & Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Servs., Eleventh Report, WT Docket No. 06-17, FCC 06-
142, at 96 (rel. Sep. 29, 2006) (Table I shows CTIA's estimate of nationwide
wireless subscribers).
6. Local Tel. Competition: Status as of June 30, 2008, at 2 (July 2009), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-292193A 1 .pdf (list-
ing number of wireline and wireless telephone subscribers as of June 30, 2008
as 154.7 million and 255.3 million, respectively).
7. Petition to Confirm A Consumer's Right to Use Internet Communications
Software and Attach Devices to Wireless Networks, RM-1 1361, filed Feb. 20,
2007 at 4 (citations omitted).
8. Frank Bruni, Where to Eat? Ask Your iPhone, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/16/dining/16note.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2010) (describing an application called Urban Spoon).
9. iPhone Golf GPS Rangefinder, available at http://www.airvuegolf.com (last
visited Nov. 3, 2010).
10. Shazam on iPhone, available at http://www.shazam.com/music/web/pages/
iphone.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
11. See Yukari Iwatani Kane & Ryan Knutson, iPhone Apps Take Root as Cottage
Industry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SBl25796886127143907.html (last visited on Nov. 3, 2010).
12. Apple iPhone - Download Games and Applications for iPhone, Learn about
apps available on the App Store, available at http://www.apple.com/iphone/
apps-for-iphone/#heroOverview (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
13. Press Release, Apple Inc., iPhone 3G on Sale Tomorrow, Over 500 Native
Applications for iPhone & iPod touch Available at Launch (July 10, 2008)
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boasts over 250,000 iPhone applications,14 and reports over 1.5 billion appli-
cation downloads to date.15 Apple receives about 8,500 new applications
each week,16 and approves around 80% of the applications as submitted.17
Apple approves 95% of applications within 14 days of their submission.18
On June 2, 2009, Google submitted a new application called Google
Voice to Apple for inclusion in the App Store.'9 In its response to the FCC
inquiry, Google stated:
Google Voice is an enhanced voice and data messaging application that
provides number management 20 and related services to users who have one
or more existing wireline or mobile phone services. The proposed Google
Voice for iPhone is a software application designed to allow Google Voice
users to utilize their iPhone to manage their phone numbers and voicemail,
integrate contacts, place outbound calls, and send SMS messages from their
Google Voice phone number.2'
Google claims that Apple wrongfully rejected the application on July 7,
2009, during a telephone conversation between Apple's Senior Vice Presi-
available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/07/Oiphone.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 9, 2009).
14. Apple iPhone Gallery - Apps for iPhone, available at http://www.apple.com/
iphone/gallery/#gallery01 (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (stating "over 250,000
ways to make the iPhone even better.").
15. Letter from Catherine A. Novelli, Vice President Worldwide Gov't Affairs,
Apple Inc., to Ruth Milkman, Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Proceeding RM- 11361 at I (filed Aug. 21, 2009) [herein-
after Apple Resp.] available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/releases/8212009-Apple
_Response.pdf.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Letter from Richard S. Whitt, Esq., Washington Telecom and Media Counsel,
Google, Inc., to James. D. Schlichting, Senior Deputy Bureau Chief, Wireless
Telecomm. Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Proceeding RM-l 1361 at 3-4 (filed Aug.
21, 2009) [hereinafter Google Resp.] available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/
document/view?id=7020037203.
20. When signing up for Google Voice, customers begin by choosing a new phone
number. Users can configure their contacts list so that when someone dials this
number, the call routes to a physical phone, such as a mobile phone or a home
phone. Users can also configure call routing based on the time of day. For
example, calls between 8:00 am and 6:00 pm could be directed to a work phone
and calls outside of those times could be routed to a different phone. See http://
www.google.com/googlevoice/about.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
21. Id.
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dent of Worldwide Product Marketing and Google's Senior Vice President of
Engineering and Research. 22
Apple's alleged denial of the Google Voice application raises the ques-
tion of whether Apple is engaging in anticompetitive conduct in violation of
the antitrust laws or the Communications Act of 1934 (hereinafter "Commu-
nications Act"), as amended. While the Department of Justice and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission are the primary enforcers of the antitrust laws,2 3
antitrust laws may also guide the FCC's inquiry into whether conduct vio-
lates the Communications Act, or merits rulemaking under the FCC's aegis.
During the inquiry process, the FCC may look for guidance from the antitrust
laws because "antitrust concerns are important components of the public in-
terest and [the FCC is] entitled, if not obliged, to consider them."24 In some
instances, the FCC may rely solely on antitrust laws in making and enforcing
its decisions under the Communications Act.25 Under U.S. law, the FCC has
jurisdiction over the communications industry and should act to further the
public interest, convenience and necessity.26 The public-interest standard
grants the FCC a wider brush than the antitrust laws. The FCC can consider
not only whether behavior is anticompetitive and weigh its justifications, but
can also consider whether conduct is in the "public interest."27
On July 31, 2009, the FCC initiated an investigation regarding Apple's
handling of the proposed Google Voice application.28 The FCC mailed let-
22. Google Resp., supra note 19, at 3-4.
23. Antitrust Division Manual, Antitrust Division Relationships with Other Agen-
cies and the Public, Fourth Edition, Page VII-4, (updated July 2009), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/atrdivman.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2010).
24. In the Matter of Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 Of The
Commission's Rules Relating To Multiple Ownership Of Standard, FM, And
Television Broadcast Stations, Doc. No. 18110, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1117-18
(Jan. 31, 1975) (responding to contentions that the FCC is only to enforce the
Communications Act and not the antitrust laws); See Nat'l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-24 (1943); see generally, Robert W. Bennett,
Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing With a Section Seven Lens, 66
Nw. U.L. REV. 159, 165 (1971).
25. United States v. RCA, Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1954) ("the
Commission might find that antitrust considerations alone would keep the stat-
utory standard [of the Communications Act of 1934] from being met"); See id.
at 354 citing 98 Cong. Rec. 7399; see also Mansfield Journal Co. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 180 F.2d 28, 33-34 (1950).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 154.
27. See In The Matter Of Rules and Policies On Foreign Participation In The U.S.
Telecomm. Market Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 13 F.C.C.R. 6219 (F.C.C. 1998).
28. FCC Proceeding Number RM- 11361, available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/
proceeding/view?z=tykm4&name=RM- 11361 (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
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ters to Apple,29 AT&T30 and Google.3' In these letters, the FCC questioned
each party's involvement with the Google Voice application. In its response
to the FCC letter, Google alleged that Apple denied the Google Voice appli-
cation, and will not allow users to purchase it in the Apple App Store.32
Apple contends that the application duplicates existing features found on Ap-
ple's popular iPhone.33 In essence, Apple's position is that Google Voice is
redundant and unnecessary for iPhone users. 34 Apple also claims that it did
not deny the Google Voice application, and that it is currently pending
review. 35
This Article will analyze the FCC's investigation and develop an analyt-
ical framework to guide the FCC's ruling. Various theories of anticompeti-
tive behavior will be analyzed under the Sherman Act,36 the Communications
Act,37 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.38 Potential theories of lia-
bility include abuse of market/monopoly power, 39 whether Apple has a duty
to deal with its competitors,40 whether Apple and AT&T are engaged in an
29. Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau,
Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, to Catherine A. Novelli, Vice President, Worldwide
Gov't Affairs, Apple Inc., Letter to Apple regarding Google Voice and related
iPhone applications, WTB Orders (DA 09-1736) (Jul. 31, 2009) available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-09-1736AI.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3, 2010).
30. Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau,
Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, to James W. Cicconi, Senior Executive Vice Presi-
dent-External and Legislative Affairs, AT&T Services, Inc., Letter to AT&T
concerning Apple's rejection of the Google Voice for iPhone Application,
WTB Orders (DA 09-1737) (Jul. 31, 2009) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.
gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-09-1737A 1 .pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
31. Letter from James D. Schlichting, Acting Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau,
Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, to Richard S. Whitt, Esq. Washington Telecom and
Media Counsel, Google Inc., Letter to Google concerning Apple's rejection of
the Google Voice for iPhone Application, WTB Orders (DA 09-1739) (Jul. 31,
2009) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-09-
1739A1.pdf (Last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
32. Google Resp., supra note 19, at 1.
33. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 2.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2009).
37. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2009).
38. Telecomms. Act of 1996, Pub. LA. No.PL 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
39. See infra Part V.A.
40. See infra Part V.B.
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anticompetitive conspiracy,41 foreclosure,42 and illegal tying.43 This article
will also analyze the parties' conduct under FCC precedent and policies.
Since most of these theories begin with defining the relevant market, this
Article will preface its analysis of legal theories with a relevant market. 44
Similarly, this Article will also discuss whether Apple has market power45 or
monopoly power,46 both of which will be used in liability theory analyses.
While the FCC and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have concurrent
jurisdiction,47 the FTC has not initiated enforcement proceedings. Should the
FTC decide to pursue enforcement of the antitrust laws on this issue, this
Article will provide guidance during those proceedings.
II. MARKET DEFINITION
Analyzing most anticompetitive behavior begins by defining the rele-
vant market.48 An accurately defined relevant market includes a seller's
product and all competing products.49 Two elements combine to form a rele-
vant market: (1) a product market and (2) a geographic market.50
Defining an accurate relevant market is critical when analyzing an-
ticompetitive behavior. An inaccurate relevant market definition creates an
imperfect subsequent analysis. Statisticians and Information Technology
professionals refer to the problem of using a bad market definition with the
phrase: "garbage in, garbage out."51 Under this theory, any analysis and con-
clusion founded on incorrect or incomplete input data can never be accurate
or reliable.
41. See infra Part V.C.
42. See infra Part V.D.
43. See infra Part V.E.
44. See infra Part II.
45. See infra Part III.
46. See infra Part IV.
47. United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 350 n.18 (1959) (The FCC
enforces the Communications Act and the FTC and Department of Justice en-
force the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act); see Catherine
J. K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, And Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role
Of The Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions In
The Net Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 660 (2009).
48. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Dep't of Justice & the Fed. Trade
Comm'n, issued April 2, 1992, § 1 August 19, 2010, § 4.0, revised April 8,
1997 [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines] available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
49. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
50. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); Lantec, Inc. v.
Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1024 (10th Cir. 2002).
51. CHRISTINE B. TAYNTOR, SIX SIGMA SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 139 (2003).
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Applying the "garbage in, garbage out" theory to antitrust analysis, de-
cisions based on an unduly narrowly defined relevant market run the risk of
excluding the effects of competing products.52 A relevant market that is too
narrow will exclude genuine substitutes, and overstate the defendant's ability
to affect the price and output.53 Likewise, decisions based on a broad, all-
encompassing relevant market "might miss harms to competition that are
masked by the improper inclusion of non-competitors."4 A market defined
too broadly to include non-substitutes results in an understatement of a de-
fendant's market power because some of the included products will not actu-
ally possess the power to influence the market.
A. Product Market
1. DOJ and FTC Guidelines
The Department of Justice and the FTC have issued joint guidelines for
defining the relevant product market.55 Under these guidelines, demand sub-
stitution factors are used to define the relevant product market.56 Products or
groups of products are included in a relevant product market if "a hypotheti-
cal profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and future seller of
those products ('hypothetical monopolist') likely would impose at least a
small but significant and nontransitory increase in price . . . ."57 The price
increase usually amounts to at least five percent and lasts for the foreseeable
future.58
Beginning with the defendant's product, the investigating agency will
ask whether the monopolist would obtain a profit by imposing a price in-
crease. 59 The agency will use a variety of factors to determine the likely
consumer response to a small price increase, including:
52. Howard A. Schelanski, Antitrust Law As Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger
Standards Protect The Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 390 (2006);
Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Mach's. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1995) (revers-
ing the district court's relevant market definition on the grounds of supply sub-
stitution, stating that it was too narrowly defined. The Tenth Circuit expanded
the relevant market to include all peripherals, including those not compatible
with IBM's computers).
53. Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 576 F.Supp. 922, 927 (D. Del 1983)
(citations omitted); see generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945).
54. See Schelanski, supra note 52, at 390.
55. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 48, at § 1.18-13.
56. Id. § 4, at 7.
57. Id. § 4.1.1, at 9. In general, prices for the specific industry are taken into
consideration.
58. Id. § 4.1.2, at 10.
59. Id. § 4.1.3, at 12.
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evidence that buyers have shifted or have considered shifting purchases
between products in response to relative changes in price or other competi-
tive variables;
evidence that sellers base business decisions on the prospect of buyer
substitution between products in response to relative changes in price or
other competitive variables;
the influence of downstream competition faced by buyers in their output
markets; and
(4) the timing and costs of switching products.60
If the agency determines that there would be no response to a small
price increase, then the agency moves to the "next best substitute" and again
considers whether a monopolist reaps a profit given a price increase.61 This
process continues until the agency finds the smallest product grouping where
a price increase would be profitable.62 The FCC may refer to these guide-
lines when investigating anticompetitive conduct.63 Although many courts
have relied upon various portions of the joint guidelines that are relevant to a
particular case, few courts have used all of the guidelines' features.64
2. Court Decisions
Courts consistently follow the product market analysis set forth in
United States E.L du Pont de Nemours & C0.65 A product market includes
all potential substitutes for the product from the perspective of the sellers and
the buyers.66 All products in a relevant market exhibit high "cross-elasticity"
60. Id. § 4.1.3, at i1-12.
61. Id. § 4.1.3, at 12. This process assumes that the prices are competitive.
62. Id.
63. Samuel J. Gordon, Note, Are You Sirius? The Mistake Of Conditioning Ap-
proval Of The Sirius-XM Merger On A Price Cap, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 513, 517 (2009).
64. Rebel Oil Co. v At. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that
the market was gasoline because self-serve and full-service vendors would re-
spond the same way if a more profitable product were introduced).
65. See Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 978 F.2d 98, 111-12 (3rd
Cir. 1992); see Walpa Constr. Corp. v. Mobile Paint Mfg. Co., 701 F. Supp. 23,
26 (D. P.R. 1988); Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894,
917-18 (10th Cir. 1975); see Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp. 825, 871-72 (D. D.C. 1982); see PSKS, Inc. v.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 2009 WL 938561, at *2-*3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6,
2009).
66. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956)
(holding that the relevant market for cellophane included other flexible wrap-
pings because they have the same qualities and were relatively interchangeable
with cellophane.); see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 83 (3d ed. 2005); see, e.g., IBM,
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of demand, which means that the products are relatively interchangeable by
consumers for the same purposes. 67 Courts look at the relative interchangea-
bility between the product in question and other potential competing prod-
ucts. 68 One way courts determine relative interchangeability is by looking at
how price changes affect consumers. In other words, courts focus on how
competing products limit the seller's ability to raise prices. However, the
analysis is not as simple as looking at effects of price changes. Consumers
may look at a number of factors when deciding whether to purchase a good
or a service, with price being only one of many considerations. Consumers
might be willing to pay more for a product with superior product quality.
Thus, courts take into consideration factors such as price, use, and qualities
when determining interchangeability.69
Under a price analysis, courts observe how changes in price for one
product would affect the demand for another.7O If a price increase for one
product causes consumers to purchase an alternative product, then those two
products compete with each other within the same product market.71 For
example, if a consumer shifts from buying mechanical pencils to buying ball-
point pens in response to a small price increase in mechanical pencils, then
the relevant market is not confined solely to mechanical pencils. It must also
include ball-point pens because they are relatively interchangeable with
mechanical pencils. However, the relevant market might be broader than
merely mechanical pencils and ball-point pens in light of how a consumer
uses the products.
Courts also consider consumer use when determining reasonable inter-
changeability.72 Continuing with the mechanical pencil analogy, the relevant
market might also include fountain pens, wood pencils, gel pens, and similar
products used in a similar fashion. However, the product market may not
include highlighters because a consumer likely does not consider a high-
lighter as a reasonable substitute to a mechanical pencil. The main objective
510 F.2d at 917-19; Southern Pac. Commc'ns, 556 F. Supp. at 871-72; see
PSKS, 2009 WL 938561, at *2-3.
67. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 400 (calling for an "an appraisal of the 'cross elasticity' of
demand in the trade" to determine whether the "commodities [are] reasonably
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes").
68. Id. at 404; Int'l Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242,
250 (1959).
69. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 404.
70. Id. at 400.
71. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 48; see also du Pont, 351 U.S. at
400.
72. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 396.
2010]
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under the use analysis is to determine whether consumers would easily shift
between products. 73
Qualities also play a role in determining the product market.74 In du
Pont, the Court considered whether the physical characteristics of cellophane
and other flexible wrappings were sufficiently similar in quality to be in-
cluded in the same product market.75 The Court stated that consumers spe-
cifically bought cellophane to be able to see through packaging to determine
food freshness: something they could not do with an opaque flexible wrap-
ping.76 Thus, the Court held that the product market included all flexible
wrappings, excluding any opaque flexible wrappings.77 In another case,
United States v. Grinnell Corp., the Court relied upon product quality to ex-
clude certain products from the product market because they were less relia-
ble and thus, less desirable.78 Continuing with the mechanical pencil
analogy, certain writing instruments may be excluded from the relevant prod-
uct market because they do not possess the same qualities required by the
user. A thick permanent marker will not likely fall within the same product
market as a mechanical pencil because the writing qualities of the two instru-
ments are very different.
3. Primary Market Analysis
The product market analysis for an Apple iPhone begins by identifying
the reasonable interchangeability of mobile devices. The standard contract
term of two years79 may complicate the analysis. Once locked into an agree-
ment, consumers lack freedom to switch mobile devices at the drop of a hat.
In addition, Apple does not allow consumers to switch their iPhones to other
network providers even after the two year contract term is over.80 This pol-
icy forces iPhone purchasers to either use AT&T wireless service if they
want to use their iPhone or abandon their iPhone investment. This Article
73. Id. at 394.
74. See id. at 394-400.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 400.
78. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 574 (1966).
79. iPhone 3GS, Exclusively from AT&T and Apple, available at http://www.att.
com/wireless/iphone/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (stating the iPhone is only
available for "*Qualified customers only. Two-year contract required.").
80. Apple has incorporated a few hardware and software features in the iPhone that
make it difficult to use an iPhone with wireless service providers other than
AT&T. See Daniel Eran Dilger, Unlocking the iPhone: The GSM SIM and
Activation, ROUGHLY DRAFTED MAGAZINE, Jul. 5, 2007, available at http://
www.roughlydrafted.com/2007/07/05/unlocking-the-iphone-the-gsm-sim-and-
activation (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
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assumes that the consumer is ready to sign a contract and is free to make a
decision to purchase any mobile device and any accompanying rate plan.81
An ordinary consumer might walk into a physical store, such as an
AT&T store, or browse a webpage in search of a new mobile phone. In-
stantly, the consumer is bombarded with choices, including the many phones
that are offered for free with a manufacturer's rebate. Do all these devices
really compete with the iPhone? Will a change in price affect a user's pro-
pensity to purchase an iPhone?82
Starting with Apple's iPhone, assume that Apple decreases the retail
price for an iPhone 4 by five percent, from $199 to $189.83 At the outset,
many mobile devices are excluded from the product market almost automati-
cally because of cost. When purchasing mobile devices, some consumers
might gravitate toward free devices because price is a critical factor.84 These
consumers are not likely to purchase an iPhone. Based on the current pricing
scheme, consumers are never able to obtain an iPhone free of charge.85 Thus,
free phones are not included in the relevant product market. For mobile de-
vices of increasing cost to the consumer, a consumer might be willing to
81. See Damon Darlin, Getting Out of a 2-Year Cellphone Contract Alive,
N.Y.TMES, Mar. 10, 2007 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/10/
technology/l0money.html (stating that contracts that lock consumers are a
standard practice among most wireless providers).
82. As of Nov. 3, 2010, an 8GB iPhone 3GS retails for $99. This version of the
iPhone does not include all of the features of the iPhone 4, which retails at
$199 for the 16GB model and $299 for the 32GB model. See Apple - iPhone -
Compare iPhone 3GS and iPhone 3G, http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare-
iphonesf (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). The analysis in this section will change if
the price of the iPhone continues to drop. See also, 5 Reasons to Buy the Apple
iPhone 3g, http://www.pcworld.com/article/146896/5_reasons-to buy-the-ap-
pie-iphone_3g.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (listing price as number one in a
list of 5 top reasons to buy an iPhone).
83. MacDailyNews.com, Gartner: Apple iPhone Continues to Increase Global
Smart Phone Market Share, MacDailyNews.com, http://macdailynews.com/in-
dex.php/weblog/comments/22068/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (Recent price ad-
justments on the 8GB 3G iPhone "has produced a clear effect on sales
volumes.").
84. See Cell Phone Shopping and Service Buying Tips From Consumer Reports:




85. Some current AT&T customers may be eligible for early upgrade pricing: $99
(8GB 3GS), $199 (16GB), or $299 (32GB) with a new two-year contract. If
the customers are not eligible for the discounted prices, the prices for the differ-
ent iPhone models are: $499 (8GB), $599 (16GB), or $699 (32GB). See Apple
- iPhone - Compare iPhone 3GS and iPhone 4, http://www.apple.com/iphone/
compare-iphones (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
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purchase one mobile device over another based on price if it provided more
bang for the buck, i.e. it is more useful to the consumer.
The line between the use and the quality prongs of the product market
test is blurry since many of a mobile device's uses are also its qualities. For
example, a consumer's desire to use a mobile device as a camera also de-
scribes the consumer's preferences in the device's qualities or characteristics.
Accordingly, this article analyzes these two prongs simultaneously. An
iPhone consumer is looking for more uses in the device than just a phone; the
consumer also considers whether it has a camera and video capture capabil-
ity, the camera resolution, data transmission speed, battery life, internet ac-
cess, and data/text access, among other considerations.86 Devices that do not
include at least a majority of these features should not be included in the
product market.
Devices that are capable of the features described above are commonly
known as "smart phones." Smart phones are mobile devices "with color
screens and heaps of features, like cameras and e-mail access."87 A con-
sumer looking for these uses or qualities would not consider a phone lacking
them to be a reasonable substitute. Thus, the product market may be as
broad as all smart phones.88 Accordingly, the primary market is not limited
to iPhones, but includes other phones that provide similar features.
4. Aftermarket Analysis
Even though there is sufficient competition in the primary market of cell
phones, or even smart phones, to provide cross-elasticity of demand, this
does not preclude the possibility of Apple having market power in an
aftermarket.89 An aftermarket includes products and services that supple-
ment, enhance or maintain the primary product or service.90 In Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., the primary products were
photocopiers and micrographic equipment manufactured and sold by Ko-
86. Top 10 Reasons to Buy the iPhone 3GS, http://www.displayblog.com/2009/06/
08/top-10-reasons-to-buy-the-iphone-3g-s/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (listing
top 10 reasons to buy an iPhone as: (1) 3.2 Megapixel Camera, (2) video, (3)
voice control, (4) GPS, (5) voice memos, (6) 7.2mpbs HSPDA, (7) longer bat-
tery life, (8) water and oil resistant, (9) Nike+, and (10) faster processor.).
87. Lisa Guernsey, The Cellphone's Potential as a Search Tool Gets Tapped, N.Y.
TImEs, May 4, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/04/technoi-
ogy/techspecial/04guemsey.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
88. See PDAs & Smartphones, http://www.wireless.att.concell-phone-service/
cell-phones/pda-phones-smartphones.jsp (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (AT&T's
website categorizes the iPhone as "Smart Phones").
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dak.91 The defendant, Kodak, allowed vendors to service and provide main-
tenance for Kodak machines, which created an aftermarket for Kodak's
photocopiers and micrographic equipment.92 After some time, Kodak altered
its policies regarding dealings with the aftermarket service vendors, perhaps
after seeing an opportunity for financial gain.93 Kodak implemented policies
that limited the supply of parts needed for the plaintiffs to maintain and ser-
vice the equipment.94 The Court held that Kodak had market power over
aftermarket parts and service, and imposed restrictions that prevented con-
sumers from switching products in the primary market.95 Customers who
purchased expensive Kodak equipment were locked in to Kodak's
aftermarket because of the high cost to switch equipment.96 Because the
aftermarket was imperfectly competitive, Kodak would not lose all sales in
response to an increase in aftermarket prices.97 While there was ample com-
petition in the primary market of photocopiers and micrographic equipment,
this fact had no bearing on Kodak's power over the aftermarket.98 Thus, one
can have monopoly power in an aftermarket even without such power in the
primary market.
In contrast, in Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,99 the
plaintiff, a franchisee, alleged that the defendant, the franchisor, abused its
monopoly power by requiring the plaintiff to conform to franchise standards,
including purchasing and using Domino's ingredients, beverages, packaging
materials, and so forth.loo The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff knew of
these terms prior to signing the contract and refused to impose liability upon
the defendant because the relevant market could not be defined by the con-
tours of a contract. 10 1 This case contrasts with Kodak because Domino's
Pizza did not alter or change any terms of the agreement after the agreement
had been made.
Apple's denial looks more like Kodak and less like Queen City Pizza
because Apple is adding restrictions to the terms and conditions. In Queen
City Pizza, there was full disclosure of the terms and conditions, and the
plaintiffs were on notice of all the terms and conditions prior to the agree-
91. Id. at 454-55.
92. See id. at 454-57.
93. See id. at 465.
94. Id. at 458.
95. Id. at 475-77.
96. Id. at 476.
97. See id. at 475-76.
98. Id. at 470-72.
99. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997).
100. Id. at 433.
101. Id. at 439-40.
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ment.102 In contrast, an iPhone purchase agreement does not include any
terms and conditions relating to acceptable marketplaces for aftermarket ap-
plications.103 Further, the terms and conditions do not state that applications
or Internet downloads are limited to those that Apple approves. 0 4 Techni-
cally speaking, Apple cannot change or alter contract terms that do not exist.
Unilaterally filling in gaps of an existing contract amounts to a material mod-
ification or alteration of the original contract.105 Requiring iPhone users to
only install applications that Apple approves for the App Store serves as a
modification of the terms and conditions, an issue the court addressed in
Kodak. As a result, this case is similar to Kodak.
Another distinguishing aspect between the present case and Queen City
Pizza is the amount of competition in the franchisee market. In Queen City
Pizza, a great deal of competition existed in the franchisee market. Queen
City Pizza could have alternatively entered into an agreement with
McDonalds, Burger King, or other such franchise restaurant chains. Here, we
are not dealing with alternative franchises. The App Store is the only source
for aftermarket applications; there are no competing franchisees in the
iPhone application market.
Moreover, interchangeability is not a factor because Apple has complete
control over the applications available on the App Store.106 Critics point out
that the interchangeability test used in du Pont only holds when the compet-
ing products are sold at competitive prices.107 Turner argues that a company
could control prices and create a high demand cross-elasticity.08 This means
that one company might already have monopoly power and the prices are at
the absolute maximum. Here, however, there are no competing products; the
only products are the aftermarket applications approved for sale by Apple in
the App Store. Thus, the relevant product market should be defined as
iPhone's and all the aftermarket iPhone applications.
Similar to Kodak, Apple does not have market power over the primary
market defined as smart phones. Apple does, however, control the
aftermarket for iPhone applications. Here, iPhone applications serve as an
aftermarket because they are purchased on an individual basis, and they
102. Id. at 440.
103. Apple.com, Application-Based Services Terms of Use, http://www.apple.com/
intemetservices/terms/membership-termshtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
104. Id.; see Apple - iPhone - Buy iPhone, infra, note 116.
105. Channell v. Citicorp Nat. Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1996).
106. Interview with Apple Help Service, Live Chat Interview with" Chetwin, AT&T
Sales Representative, (Nov. 19, 2009) ("The only applications you can
download and install on your iPhone must be purchased from the App Store.
You can't get them any other way.").
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maintain or supplement the iPhone's software. The aftermarket mobile
phone application market for smart phones is very large and important for
iPhone users.1 09 Apple features over 250,000 applications for sale in its App
Store." 10 All applications sold in the App Store only work on Apple's iPhone
and not on any other smart phone. Apple may argue that the aftermarket
definition must be defined as all aftermarket applications for all smart phones
because many application developers create aftermarket applications for use
on many different smart phones. Indeed, the application at issue here was
developed for multiple mobile platforms including the iPhone, Blackberry,
and Android-based phones."' However, since the Google Voice application
in question was intended for use on the iPhone, the product market should be
defined as aftermarket applications purchased from Apple's App Store for
use on the iPhone.
B. Geographic Market
The second aspect of determining the relevant market is defining the
geographic market. A geographic market is the area where a consumer looks
for the goods or services he seeks to purchase.12 The analysis should follow
the consumer and not the seller. A geographic market is not where the seller
attempts to sell the product.1 3 The scope of the geographic market is a ques-
tion of fact and should be determined in each case "in acknowledgment of
the commercial realities of the industry being considered.""114
Here, the geographic market analysis begins with where the consumer
looks to purchase iPhones and applications for iPhones. A user seeking to
purchase an iPhone has three options: a physical AT&T store, AT&T's web-
site,"15 or Apple's website. 1 6 AT&T stores are geographically limited, but
consumers can access the internet virtually anywhere, including while they
109. Justin Lee, Smartphone Market Trends, SLIDE 79, http://www.slideshare.net/
1is186/smartphone-market-trends (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (positing that sev-
enty-six percent of iPhone subscribers have installed applications, thus sug-
gesting this market is important for the overwhelming majority of iPhone
users).
110. Apple - iPhone - Gallery - TV Ads, supra note 14.
Ill. See Google Voice for your mobile phone, http://www.google.com/mobile/voice
(last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
112. Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 212 (3d Cir. 2005).
113. Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 726 (3d Cir. 1991).
114. Gordon, 423 F.3d at 212.
115. AT&T Wireless, http://www.attwireless.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
116. Apple - iPhone - Buy iPhone, http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shop-
iphone/family/iphone (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
20101
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
fly.117 Rather than looking to where a consumer could purchase an iPhone
with AT&T service, a better approach to determining the geographic market
might be to look at where a consumer could use the product. Assuming con-
sumers demand a 3G data connection to download various applications, the
geographic market is where AT&T provides 3G service. 118
C. Relevant Market Defined
The relevant market is defined by the product market and the geo-
graphic market.119 Thus, the relevant market should be defined as: applica-
tions available for download and installation on the Apple iPhone using the
App Store, wherever 3G service is available.
III. MARKET POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKET
Once the relevant product and geographic markets are defined, the next
step in analyzing most anticompetitive behavior is determining whether the
firm has market power.120 Without market power, there is little reason to be
concerned with the acts of a single firm under the antitrust laws.121 Market
power is the ability to raise prices above a competitive level for a sustained
amount of time and not lose market share.122 A firm that lacks market power
cannot force or impose its products on consumers through its conduct. Nor
could such a firm attempt to "price squeeze" by undercutting competitors or
charging more than competitors.123 When a firm has market power, it has the
117. Scott McCartney, In the Air, Wi-Fi Gets a Ho-Hum Reception, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 27, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000 14240529702
03706604574374571364228440.html (last visited on Nov. 3, 2010).
118. For a map displaying AT&T's 33 service, see AT&T Coverage Viewer, http://
www.wireless.att.com/coverageviewer/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
119. See discussion supra Part II.
120. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST, MONOGRAPH No. 12, HORIZONTAL MERG-
ERS: LAW AND POLICY 153-61 (1986) (illustrating that the next step in analyz-
ing anti-competitive behavior is to determine whether there is market power);
see also Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After
Kodak, 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 71-85 (1993) (outlining a framework to
determine whether a firm possesses market power).
121. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 500
(1992).
122. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981); 42nd Parallel North v. E Street Denim Co.,
286 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 2002); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg.
Co., 61 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1995).
123. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109, 1114 (U.S.
2009).
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ability to force consumers to do something they would not do in a competi-
tive market. 124
A firm that possesses market power can control prices or exclude com-
petition.125 Direct evidence of the injurious exercise of market power is the
best route to show market power.126 If direct evidence of market power does
not exist, then the existence of market power can be inferred from the seller's
possession of a predominant share of the market.127 While a market share
can serve as a proxy for determining market power, it necessarily requires
that the market definition accurately reflect commercial realities.128 How-
ever, courts generally qualify inferences of market power from market share
using factors including entry conditions, the size and stability of the market
shares over time, and profitability.129
In du Pont, the government alleged that du Pont monopolized the cello-
phane market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.130 The govern-
ment, which has the burden of proving that the defendant possesses a high
degree of market power, 131 argued that seventy-five percent of cellophane in
the U.S. was produced by du Pont, and this showed, at least prima facie, that
du Pont possessed market power.132
The FCC looks at a number of factors when determining whether a firm
has a market power. In the Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a
124. Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 207-09 (4th Cir. 2002).
125. Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atd. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003); see
K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 129.
126. Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 14211434.
127. Eastman Kodak, Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992);
United States v. Grinnell, Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Flegel v. Christian
Hosp., 4 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 1993); see K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs, 61
F.3d 123 (stating that market share is not the sole factor but it is a significant
factor in a determination of market power); Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that to establish
that a firm has a market power, the accusing party must show the firm has a
dominant share in a well-defined relevant market).
128. Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 318 (8th Cir. 1986);
Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1971).
129. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990);
Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987) (asking whether
there was a strong preference for the product and whether barriers to entry or
expansion by competitors existed).
130. United States v. E.I. du Pont, de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 377-79 (1956).
131. Id. at 381.
132. Id. at 379-80.
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Non-Dominant Carrier,33 the FCC considered four factors: (1) "AT&T's
market share"; (2) "the supply elasticity of the market"; (3) "the demand
elasticity of AT&T's customers"; and (4) "AT&T's cost structure, size and
resources." 134
If the relevant market is defined as applications available for download
and installation on the Apple iPhone using the App Store, wherever 3G ser-
vice is available,135 then Apple's market power is readily defined. Apple has
100% of the market share of applications available for sale in its App
Store.136 The requirements that Apple must approve each application before
it can be included in the App Store and that the iPhone software will only
allow applications from the App Store both create a significant barrier to
entry, even to the point of foreclosing any aftermarket competitors.
Apple's revenues from iPhone applications are hotly debated. Apple
maintains that the App Store was designed to break even or better.37 Ana-
lyst predictions of App Store revenues range from $20 million per year to
$110 million per year, although those figures do not account for operating
costs. 138 As a new industry,139 the size and stability of the iPhone application
industry is difficult to measure. Given Apple's unfettered ability to control
all applications in the App Store, Apple possesses market power the iPhone
application market.
IV. MONOPOLY POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKET
A firm has monopoly power when it has the ability to control prices or
exclude competition in a relevant market.140 Possession of monopoly power,
133. In re Establishment Of Rules And Policies For The Digital Audio Radio Satel-
lite Service In The 2310-2360 Mhz Frequency Band, 11 F.C.C.R. 3,271,
3,2933271, 3293-94 (1995).
134. Id.
135. See supra Part 11.3.
136. Interview with Apple Help Service, Live Chat Interview with Chetwin, AT&T
Sales Representative, (Nov. 19, 2009) ("The only applications you can
download and install on your iPhone must be purchased from the App Store.
You can't get them any other way").
137. Interview by Dan Moren and Philip Michaels, Macworld.com, with Peter Op-
penheimer, Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer, Apple Inc. (Jul.
21, 2008) available at http://www.macworld.com/article/134594/2008/07/live
update.html.
138. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, How Apple profits from the App Store, CNN MONEY,
May 14, 2009, http://brainstormtech.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2009/05/14/how-
apple-profits-from-the-app-store/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
139. See supra note 13 (describing that the Apple App Store opened just over a year
ago).
140. United States v. E.I. du Pont, de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).
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however, requires something greater than simply possessing market power.' 4'
While market share is useful when defining a firm's market power, it does
not carry much weight in monopoly power determinations.142 Having a sub-
stantial market share alone is "not enough to determine a firm's capacity to
achieve a monopoly."43 Although a high market share helps support an in-
ference of monopoly power, it is less important in markets with low entry
barriers or where the firm is unable to control prices or exclude
competitors. "44
Similar to the analysis of whether Apple has market power, Apple has a
100% market share for aftermarket applications. The entry barriers are also
substantially high-consumers may download and install only applications
approved by Apple and found in the App Store.45 This requirement alone
essentially excludes all others from entering into this market because it for-
bids any application generally available on the internet, but not specifically
approved by Apple, for download on the iPhone. Thus, Apple has monopoly
power over applications for use on iPhones.
V. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
In analyzing Apple's conduct relating to the Google Voice application,
the FCC should, in addition to its investigation under the Communications
Act, look to the antitrust laws to determine whether Apple is engaged in
actionable anticompetitive behavior. Various theories of liability-such as
abuse of monopoly power, refusal to deal, conspiracy, foreclosure and ty-
ing-all shed light on the FCC's investigation. The relevant market is now
141. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 (1992).
142. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
143. Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 783 F.2d 159, 162 (10th Cir. 1986);
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir.
1980) ("[b]lind reliance upon market share, divorced from commercial reality,
could give a misleading picture of a firm's actual ability to control prices or
exclude competition").
144. Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1988).
145. While this is not stated in the terms of service, software limitations on the
iPhone prevent iPhone owners from installing any third-party applications that
are obtained from sources other than the App Store. See Jesus Diaz, How to:
Install Unofficial Apps on Your iPhone 3G or iPod Touch, Easily and Safely,
gizmodo.com, Mar. 7, 2009, http://gizmodo.com/I66029/how-to-install-apps-
on-your-iphone-3g-or-ipod-touch-easily-and-for-free (last visited Nov. 3,
2010).
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clearly defined,146 and Apple possesses both market 47 and monopoly
power.148
A. Abuse of Monopoly Power
One theory of liability turns on whether Apple's alleged denial of the
Google Voice application amounts to an abuse of monopoly power. Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony."149 To monopolize or
attempt to monopolize, a firm must first possess the ability to create monop-
oly power.150 While a firm or person may obtain monopoly power "merely
by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry,"15, actions specifically
intended to further or retain the monopoly power violate Section 2.152
Courts have looked at a monopolist's conduct to determine whether it
abused its monopoly power. In Kodak, the Court reasoned that the
aftermarket service vendors were "locked-in" to the product, which increased
the cost of service because there were no other alternatives.153 The Court
held that Kodak had used the aftermarket service vendor's dependency on
continuing to service Kodak's machines to its own advantage and announced
that Kodak had abused its monopoly power.154
Courts also examine a monopolist's conduct when it is making state-
ments to potential customers. In Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solu-
tions,155 the Ninth Circuit addressed whether statements made to a potential
customer were "a commercial advertisement or promotion" or contractual
and binding in nature. 56 For a statement of fact to be a commercial adver-
tisement or promotion, the court must find that the statement is: (1) commer-
146. See supra Part 11.3.
147. See supra Part Il.
148. See supra Part IV.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
150. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2nd Cir. 1945).
151. Id. at 430.
152. Id at 429; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U. S. 244 (1968).
153. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477-78. (1992).
154. Id. at 485-86.
155. United States v. Mendez, 513 F.3d 1038, 1054 (9th Cir. 2008).
156. See also In re Apple & AT&T Anti-Trust Litigation, 596 F.Supp.2d 1288
(where a consumer alleged that AT&T didn't disclose the roaming charges up-
front after he was charged high roaming costs. The plaintiff was out of the
country and his phone was passively checking his email. This survived a mo-
tion for summary judgment).
[Vol. XIV
Antitrust and Communications Policy
cial speech; (2) made by the defendant; (3) for the purpose of "influencing
consumers to buy" its goods or services.157
Applying the Newcal factors, Apple's advertisements are commercial
speech because they invite consumers to purchase their iPhone. The second
factor is easily satisfied as Apple publishes their advertisements on their
webpage.158 The third factor is more complex. Apple invites or influences
consumers to by its iPhone, but does the advertisement also include state-
ments that influence consumers to purchase applications? On one hand, Ap-
ple invites users to purchase the iPhone because there is "an app for just
about anything."159 A reasonable user might assume that since Apple sells
the iPhone, it also is the sole provider of the aftermarket applications. On the
other hand, the advertisements do not specifically say there is an app for just
about anything in the App Store. Consumers could reasonably believe that
they can download and use apps for just about anything from any provider on
the Internet. Additionally, AT&T offers "unlimited data," 60 which may lead
a consumer to believe that statement means they have unlimited ability to
download an unlimited number of applications from an unlimited number of
sources on the web.
Apple and AT&T also require users to sign up for an "unlimited data"
plan to activate the iPhone.' 6 1 Neither Apple's terms of service nor AT&T's
terms of service include provisions that expressly limit iPhone users to only
applications found in the App Store.162 Surely Apple and AT&T will argue
that unlimited data is limited by the device's software and hardware capabili-
ties. Software limitations would allow consumers to install only those pro-
grams that are designed for the iPhone. Similarly, hardware would limit an
iPhone user from accessing a movie in surround sound, since the iPhone does
not include surround sound hardware.
The provision "unlimited data" allows iPhone users unlimited access to
all accessible content. To illustrate this argument, consider an example.
Cable TV subscribers generally have unlimited access to watch TV. The
subscribers are technologically limited by their TV, as they can only watch
one program at a time on a single TV.
157. Mendez, 513 F.3d at 1054 (citing Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title
Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 735 (9th Cir.1999)).
158. See Apple iPhone Gallery - TV Ads, supra note I.
159. Id.
160. AT&T, Messaging & Data, http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/
get-started/index.jsp?q retu mUrl=/cell-phone-service/services/services-l ist.jsp
%3Fcatld%3Dcat 1470003%26LOSGId%3D%26catName%3DMessaging%2B
%2526%2BData%26_requestid%3D10028 (enter zip code to obtain data plan
information) (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
161. Id.
162. See Apple.com, Application-Based Services Terms of Use, supra note 105.
2010]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
However, Apple's argument that iPhone users have unlimited access is
akin to a cable TV company telling its subscribers they can view the channel
guide, but not watch any programs. Without Apple's approval, iPhone users
can view internet sites, but not download programs. To be sure, iPhone users
can browse the vast information available on the internet. But Apple's posi-
tion is that users are prohibited from using downloadable content that can be
accessed using the internet connection. Before determining whether this pol-
icy amounts to abuse of monopoly power, this Article will first analyze the
duty to deal defense.
B. Duty to Deal
In general, a business has the power to decide whether to do business
with its competitors, providing the business does not abuse its monopoly
power or attempt to monopolize.163 This does not mean that the right to
refuse to deal is left unqualified.164 A firm does not have an affirmative duty
to deal with its competitors, unless the refusal to deal is for the purpose of
creating or maintaining a monopoly.65 In such a case, refusal to deal can
amount to anticompetitive behavior and violate Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 166
In Colgate, the Court recognized a firm's right to refuse to deal with
other businesses.167 Subsequent cases have followed Colgate and provide
guidance as to what types of conduct disallow a monopolist from refusing to
deal. In Kodak, the Court reviewed a jury verdict that found that Kodak
exercised a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act.168 Kodak refused to
continue to sell photographic supplies to a retailer after the retailer declined
to sell its business to Kodak.169 The Court determined that the jury could
163. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Verizon Commc'ns
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408-09 (2004).
164. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (explaining that situations where a firm has an affirma-
tive duty to deal with its competitors are very limited) (citations omitted); see
also Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Commn'n, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (holding that group boycotts or refusals to deal are not permissible be-
cause the group acts as a cartel against the interests of the free market).
165. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307 ("[iun the absence of any purpose to create or main-
tain a monopoly," and entity may "freely exercise his own independent discre-
tion as to parties with whom he will deal"); see also Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1951) (finding a section 2 violation
where a newspaper company refused to advertise for a business because it also
advertised on a radio station).
166. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
167. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 306-07 (noting that the government did not allege that
Colgate breached an existing contract).
168. Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
169. Id. at 368-69.
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have reasonably determined that Kodak's refusal to deal was not "actuated
by innocent motives," but rather "by an intention and desire to perpetuate a
monopoly. "170 The Court affirmed the verdict, stating that Kodak's refusal to
deal was "in furtherance of a purpose to monopolize."171 Taking a similar
position, in Otter Tail Power v. United States, the Court found a Section 2
violation when a monopolist refused to sell or transmit power to municipal
power systems "solely to prevent" them from "eroding its monopolistic posi-
tion."172 The defendant was already in the business of providing services,
and refused to provide the same services to others.173 The Court held that the
defendant's exclusionary refusal to deal supported its purpose to
monopolize.174
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the plaintiff al-
leged that it had enjoyed a long-standing business relationship with the de-
fendant.Iv5 The plaintiff argued that after the defendant became dominant in
the relevant market, it changed its course of dealing and engaged in anticom-
petitive behavior by refusing to deal with the plaintiff.176 The defendant re-
fused to deal, even after the plaintiff offered to provide compensation at retail
price.177 In the Court's view, this refusal to deal demonstrates anticompeti-
tive intent, because in an attempt to maintain their business relationship, the
plaintiff provided an extraordinary offer to the defendant, but the defendant
remained unavailing.178
In the past 5 years, the Court granted certiorari for two cases involving
refusals-to-deal. In the first case, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the Court distinguished the facts from Aspen
because there were no previous course of dealings, and there were no allega-
tions that the defendant decided to forfeit short-term profits in hopes of a
long-term financial return.179 In the second case, Pacific Bell Telephone Co.
v. Linkline Communications, Inc., the Court held that when a firm has no
duty to deal at the wholesale level, and does not utilize predatory pricing at
170. Id. at 375.
171. Id.
172. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973).
173. Id. at 370-71, 377-78.
174. Id. at 378.
175. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 589-90
(1985).
176. Id. at 589-90, 591-92.
177. Id. at 608, 610-11.
178. Id.
179. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 399,
409-10 (2004).
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the retail level, then the firm also has no duty to deal with its competitors in
the context of a price-squeeze claim.180
To summarize almost eighty years of refusal-to-deal cases, the purpose
and intent of the party's refusal plays a significant role in determining a vio-
lation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Unilateral refusals-to-deal intended
to create or maintain a monopoly likely violate Section 2, while refusals
based on other motivations could be lawful. Such other motivations are al-
lowable "only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal."18,
Parties accused of participating in illegal refusals must provide adequate bus-
iness justifications for the refusal to evade liability.182 Trinko suggests that
the courts will rarely impose an affirmative duty to deal: "[t]he Sherman Act
is indeed the 'Magna Carta of free enterprise,' but it does not give judges
carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business when-
ever some other approach might yield greater competition."183
1. Did Apple Deny the Google Voice Application?
A threshold question is whether Apple denied the Google Voice appli-
cation, or if it is still pending review. Apple, of course, maintains that it has
not denied the application, but that it is under consideration.184 Apple also
readily advertises that it approves 95% of all applications within 14 days of
submission.185 Apple claims that it actively engages in providing application
developers with "helpful feedback" by suggesting modifications to get the
application approved.86 Apple paints itself as an active participant in bring-
ing as many applications to the App Store as possible.
The only helpful feedback Google claims to have received from Apple
is that it believes that Google Voice duplicates the core dialer functionality of
the iPhone, and that Apple did not want to allow applications that would
replace the iPhone software.87 This short explanation does not seem like
helpful feedback that will help Google modify the application to work on the
iPhone. Instead, it seems to prevent Google from competing with Apple in
those applications or features. On the other hand, the essence of the Google
Voice application is to perform phone related tasks, such as placing phone
calls, listening to voicemail, and sending and receiving SMS messages. Ap-
ple cannot offer much explanation for a denial if the application cannot be
180. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009).
181. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).
182. Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through The Aspen/Ko-
dak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 496 (1999).
183. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415-16.
184. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 12.
185. Id. at 2, 6.
186. Id. at 2.
187. Google Resp., supra note 19, at 3.
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changed in such a way that would make it allowable on the iPhone. Apple
also states that it does not know whether the Google Voice application uses a
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") element in executing its functions.188
A quick glance at the Google Voice website would have revealed this infor-
mation. Even AT&T knew that Google Voice is not a VoIP service.189 This
statement begs the question of whether Apple actually considered Google's
application. In light of Apple and AT&T's specific agreement to exclude
VoIP,190 an inquiry into whether the application used VoIP seems like a
threshold question, or at least an important facet to consider early in the re-
view process, something Apple did not do
Another consideration that sheds light on whether Apple denied the
Google Voice application is its treatment for three similar Google applica-
tions. These applications91 allowed users to use Google Voice features on a
mobile phone. Apple had previously approved these applications192 and re-
voked the approval around the time Google submitted its own official appli-
cation. A revocation tends to look more like a denial, not like an application
pulled back for reconsideration.
The time between Google's submission and Apple's alleged denial
shows that the decision to approve Google Voice is complex. Google sub-
mitted the Google Voice application to Apple for inclusion in the App Store
at the beginning of June 2009. Apple's alleged denial took place sometime
before July 31, 2009.193 This time period lapse is more than one month,
placing it in a category of very few applications (5%) that take more than 14
days to approve. In light of Apple's statements and this policy to approve
95% of all applications within 14 days of submission, if Apple is still review-
ing the Google Voice application, it is either a difficult decision or Apple is
dragging its feet. Given Apple's lack of helpful feedback, its treatment of
other similar applications, lack of transparency in the application review pro-
cess, and the time elapsed since Google's submission, Apple's conduct sug-
gests that Apple may have denied approval of the Google Voice application.
188. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4.
189. Letter from James W. Cicconi, Senior Exec. Vice President-External and Leg-
islative Affairs, AT&T Servs., Inc., to Ruth Milkman, Chief, Wireless
Telecomms. Bureau, Federal Commc'n Comm'n, Proceeding RM-1 1361 at
Fed. Commc'n, AT&T Response to Telecomms Bureau Letter, 9 (filed Aug.
21, 2009) [hereinafter AT&T Resp.] available at: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/
document/view?id=7020037203.
190. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4; AT&T Resp., supra note 189, at 6-7.
191. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 3 (The programs are GVDialer / GV Dialer Lite,
VoiceCentral, GV Mobile / GV Mobile Free).
192. Id. at 2-3.
193. Google Resp., supra note 19, at 3-41.
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2. Apple's Purpose or Intent in Denying the Google Voice
Application
Determining Apple's purpose or intent in allegedly denying the Google
Voice application is critical to the question of whether Apple has a duty to
deal with Google. In its letter to the FCC in response to the inquiry, Apple
cites multiple justifications for rejecting applications.194 Apple asserted that
it may reject applications based on content, protecting consumer privacy, or
because the application is harmful to the device, the network, or both.195 In
other words, Apple will reject an application if it degrades the "core experi-
ence of the iPhone."196
Another reason Apple will choose to reject an application is if the appli-
cation "in Apple's reasonable judgment may be found objectionable, for ex-
ample, materials that may be considered obscene, pornographic, or
defamatory."197 Apple decides what it thinks is best for iPhone users and
approves or denies an App Store application accordingly. For example, Ap-
ple will reject all applications that contain pornography.98 On the other
hand, Apple may decide to approve applications with objectionable content
that may not be suitable for all audiences, such as graphic combat violence,
provided an age appropriate rating accompanies the application.99 In other
words, Apple regards content as part of the core user experience.
The core experience also includes Apple's iPhone software.200 Apple
claims that its software is essential to the iPhone's "distinctive experience"
and that it "spent a lot of time and effort developing [a] distinct and innova-
tive way to seamlessly deliver core functionality of the iPhone."20, Apple
contends that the Google Voice application invades the iPhone's seamlessly
designed software by replacing and disabling Apple's Visual Voicemail, by
using a different method to manage SMS text messages, and by managing the
Contacts database from Google's servers. 202
Apple has a strong interest in ensuring the software on the iPhone works
properly and smoothly. If a consumer becomes frustrated with software er-
rors while running aftermarket applications, the consumer might opt to buy
and use a different brand mobile device. Thus, Apple should be able to en-
194. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4-65.
195. Id. at 5.
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id. at 5.




202. Id. at 2 (stating that Apple has not received any assurances from Google that
contact details will only be used in appropriate ways).
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sure that all aftermarket applications do not degrade the core experience.
However, Apple may not reject applications for the purpose of creating or
maintaining a monopoly.203
In Google's response to the FCC, it points out that Apple has approved
other Google applications, such as Google Earth and the Google Mobile ap-
plication.204 The significance of these two applications is that both provide
features that exist on the iPhone right out of the box. Google Earth is similar
to the native maps application on the iPhone. The Google Mobile application
includes capability to search the web, maintain a calendar, and manage
photos-each performing functions similar to Apple's Safari browser, native
calendar, and photo applications, respectively. Similar to Google Voice,
these applications provide functionality that might be duplicative of applica-
tions native to the iPhone. A major difference between these applications
and Google Voice is that Google Voice allegedly duplicates or replaces the
core function of a mobile device-the ability to make and receive telephone
calls.205 Apple may have a pro-competitive justification in preserving the
phone aspects of the device, but may not be as interested in the peripheral
applications, such as web search, calendar or maps.
Apple contends that it isn't denying users from using Google Voice, as
users have full access to the web-based version of Google Voice through
Apple's Safari browser.206 This statement, however, is misleading because
the web-based version is not a perfect substitute. The web-based version of
Google Voice lacks significant features that motivate consumers to install the
application rather than use the web-based version. The features of the web-
based version are limited.207 For example, the web-based version does not
allow direct access to the iPhone address book, which means iPhone users
must maintain two sets of contacts: one on the native iPhone contact applica-
tion and another with Google applications. Further, the web-based version
does not dial directly from the application, while the installable app does.208
Google argues that this lack of functionality actually impedes the device,
while the downloadable application fosters and provides a more seamless
experience to the iPhone user. 209 Essentially, Google argues that the applica-
tion may actually improve the overall user experience, more so than with the
web-based application.
When Google's application was denied, Apple iPhone users were the
ones who suffered. With net-neutrality a topic of debate, many users are
203. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
204. Google Resp., supra note 19, at 4.
205. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 2.
206. Id. at 3.
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affected by Apple's denial of the application. After viewing an Apple adver-
tisement, a reasonable consumer gets the impression that there is "an applica-
tion for just about anything." 210 The consumer then goes to the nearest
AT&T store, or to the web to purchase an iPhone, thinking that they can do
just about anything with an iPhone. The consumer concurrently purchases an
iPhone data plan that includes 2GB of data in the U.S.211 The average con-
sumer might understand this as meaning they can use the phone to access and
download anything they please, as long as it was within the plan's usage
limit. However, under Apple and AT&T's current practices, an iPhone user
cannot download and install the Google Voice application, though its terms
of service do not explicitly say this. In practice, the phone's use is limited to
2GB of the content Apple and AT&T approve.2 12
3. AT&T's Response
In its response letter to the FCC, AT&T attempted to explain that users
should know and expect that iPhone applications can only be downloaded
from the App Store.213 AT&T posits that users are bombarded with a multi-
tude of new electronic devices, each with its own set of benefits and limita-
tions.214 Referring to Amazon's Kindle as an analogy, AT&T argues that
users understand that the Kindle includes free internet access for the lifetime
of the product, but does not permit phone calls to or from the device.215
AT&T's comparison is inadequate, however, because Amazon conspicuously
displays the terms and conditions of the internet access in a large font under
the product description.216 In contrast, both Apple and AT&T do not provide
similar information to the consumer about where they can obtain
applications.
As an experiment, the Author attempted to simulate an ordinary con-
sumer's experience when purchasing an iPhone in late 2009. The Author
210. See Apple iPhone Gallery - TV Ads, supra note 1; see Apple - iPhone, Over
250,000 ways to make iPhone even better, supra note 2; see also iPhone 3g
Commercial "There's An App For That" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sz
rsfeyLzyg (November 3, 2010).
211. Data Plans with Wi-Fi - DataPlus and DataPro Plans - Wireless from AT&T,
http://www.att.com/shop/wireless/plans/data-plans.jsp (last visited Nov. 3,
2010).
212. For a discussion on deceptive business practices in the broadband realm, see
Sandoval, supra note 47.
213. AT&T Resp., supra note 189, at 13; Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 1.
214. Id. at 3-4.
215. Id.
216. Amazon.com, Kindle Wireless Reading Device (6" Display, Global Wireless,
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browsed both Apple and AT&T's website for terms and conditions regarding
downloading and installing aftermarket applications. Neither website con-
tained any information on what a user can install on an iPhone.217 The
AT&T site included an option to chat live with a customer service represen-
tative. The Author initiated a chat session, but the representative was unable
to define or point to terms and conditions for aftermarket applications.218
The representative stated that Apple controlled the aftermarket applications
and provided the Author a phone number to speak with an Apple customer
service representative. The Author then called the Apple representative, who
likewise could not point to any terms and conditions governing aftermarket
application use.2 19 In the conversation, the Author asked if such a document
or disclosure existed. The Apple representative responded by saying that
there is no such document or disclosure and "the only applications you can
download and install on your iPhone must be purchased from the App Store.
You can't get them any other way."220 This response begs the question of
whether any iPhone purchasers really understand Apple's policies on
aftermarket application use. The first generation iPhone displayed the terms
and conditions on the box, which the consumer did not receive until after.
purchasing an iPhone. This box, however, does not mention any terms and
conditions regarding applications.
Some iPhone users are annoyed enough that they have expressed their
concerns to the FCC. After purchasing an iPhone, some users want to be
able to install any application of their choosing, so long as it does not cause
network disruption.21 Their argument is that limiting a user's choice of ap-
plications is similar to buying a computer where the manufacturer mandates
that the user may only run Microsoft Office and disallows any other alterna-
tive.222 These dissatisfied users have also expressed similar concerns about
not being able to run alternative software and complain that if Microsoft
prevented Apple's Safari browser from working with Windows, Microsoft
would be "in big trouble with the FCC."223
217. See Apple.com, Application-Based Services Terms of Use, supra note 103.
218. Live Chat Interview with Chetwin, AT&T Sales Representative (Nov. 17,
2009).
219. Telephone Conversation, Apple Sales Representative (Nov. 17, 2009).
220. Id.
221. Letter from Paul Nuyujukian to FCC Regarding FCC Proceeding RM- 11361
(Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/documentL/view?id=70
20038940.
222. Id.
223. Letter from Thomas Anderson to FCC Regarding FCC Proceeding RM- 11361
(Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=70
20039446.
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4. Apple's Justification
Apple may choose to deny an application is to honor its contractual
agreements with AT&T, the exclusive service provider for the iPhone. In its
response to the FCC, Apple cites to a private agreement with AT&T that
obligates Apple not to approve any applications that would harm AT&T's 3G
network.224 Such harm includes legitimate concerns about efficiency and po-
tential network congestion.225
Apple states that "[n]o contractual conditions or non-contractual under-
standings with AT&T have been a factor in Apple's decision-making pro-
cess."226 In essence, Apple's position is that Apple has not based its
decisions regarding the Google Voice application for reasons relating to the
private agreement with AT&T. Arguably, Apple makes this statement to
avoid potential conspiracy charges, but this statement forecloses any argu-
ments that the Google Voice rejection was based on concerns over harm to
AT&T's network. Further, this statement may even amount to an admission
by Apple that Google Voice does not cause harm to the network.
Apple's denial is similar to Otter Tail Power, where the defendant en-
gaged in business with some companies but excluded others.227 Applying
Otter Tail Power, Apple's claims that the refusal was based on business justi-
fication of reasonable network management is not valid. Apple agreed to
prevent any applications from harming AT&T's network.228 Other smart
phones, such as the Blackberry from Research-in-Motion and numerous An-
droid-based devices, use the Google Voice application on the AT&T net-
work. Nevertheless, had Apple not rejected the three applications that used
the Google Voice features229 and excluded Google, the application of Otter
Tail Power to this case would have been much more compelling.
Similar to Aspen Skiing, where the parties enjoyed a long-standing busi-
ness relationship which was a fundamental aspect of the holding, Google had
reason to believe that Apple would approve the Google Voice application.230
As mentioned earlier in this section, Apple had already approved Google
Earth and Google Mobile applications.231 Further support of Google's notion
that Apple would approve Google Voice is that Apple had approved three
224. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 3.
227. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973).
228. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4.
229. See Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4; AT&T Resp., supra note 189, at 6-7.
230. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608
(1985).
231. See Google Resp., supra note 19, at 4.
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applications that accessed and used the Google Voice service. 232 These three
applications provided similar functionality as the proposed Google Voice
application.233
Apple is not the first company to implement tight policies to ensure
market dominance. Apple's policy to extend and maintain power over
aftermarket applications is surprisingly similar to actions taken by Microsoft
to maintain monopoly power in the computer operating system software mar-
ket.234 In Microsoft, the defendant identified software that could erode its
monopoly power on computer operating systems and worked for over four
years to prevent development of this software.235 The court found that
Microsoft took "exclusionary acts that lacked pro-competitive justification"
by imposing various restrictions in its software.236 The court further found
that Microsoft imposed these restrictions not "to maintain a somewhat amor-
phous quality it refers to as the 'Integrity' of the Windows platform, nor even
to ensure that Windows afforded a uniform and stable platform for applica-
tions development," but to prevent other software from destroying its monop-
oly power over the relevant market.237 Here, Apple's policy to oversee each
and every application before approving for the App Store bears a striking
resemblance to Microsoft's exclusionary acts to preclude competition be-
cause it crosses the line from a legitimate business decision into an anticom-
petitive one.238 Additionally, Apple's attempt to maintain the core
experience of the iPhone mirrors Microsoft's argument that its actions were
based on maintaining the integrity of the Windows platform. 239 Considering
the totality of the circumstances, Apple's refusal to permit the Google Voice
application points toward an illegal intent to monopolize.
C. Conspiracy
Agreements to create or further a monopoly are unlawful. Section 1 of
the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce."240 One purpose of Section 1 is to penalize
agreements to commit monopolistic behavior between at least two parties
acting jointly.241 For liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the parties
232. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 3.
233. Id.
234. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
235. Id. at 38.
236. Id. at 39-42.
237. Id. at 41.
238. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4.
239. Id. at 4-5.
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
241. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
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must share a "unity of purpose or a common design and understanding or a
meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement."242
In some instances, the offenders formalize an agreement. In Parke Da-
vis, the defendant conspired with wholesalers to withhold products from re-
tailers that did not observe the defendant's suggested retail prices.243 Parke
Davis enlisted the wholesalers to enforce its decision to refuse to deal with
the offending retailers.244 When a retailer failed to comply, Parke Davis sup-
plied the wholesaler the information and the wholesaler subsequently stopped
the supply of goods to the retailers.245 The Court held that this arrangement
was an illegal conspiracy that violated the antitrust laws.246 The Court rea-
soned that Parke Davis could have merely announced its policy that it would
not deal with retailers that did not follow its policy regarding suggested retail
prices.247 However, under the Sherman Act, Parke Davis could not co-opt
the wholesalers to enforce their policy.248
When an explicit agreement to engage in anticompetitive behavior does
not exist, the question turns toward whether there is evidence of such an
agreement.249 In many instances, parties make covert agreements that are
difficult to discover. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the existence of an
agreement. 250 This burden is governed by the preponderance of the evidence
standard.251
During discussion around the iPhone offering, Apple and AT&T entered
into a contractual agreement making AT&T and Apple the only authorized
242. Id. at 771.
243. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 34 (1960).
244. Id. at 45.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 47-48.
247. Id. at 45.
248. Id.
249. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966)
("[E]xplicit agreement is not a necessary part of a Sherman Act conspiracy...
[where] joint and collaborative action was pervasive in the initiation, execution,
and fulfillment of the plan"); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 720 (1965) ("Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("[O]nly
rarely will there be direct evidence of an express agreement"); Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1984) (discussing how a
newsletter from a distributor to a dealer-customer discussing various incentives
and shipping policies and a assurance to maintain a minimum market price was
enough to show evidence of a conspiracy).
250. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763 (requiring the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence
to meet its burden of proving an agreement to fix prices).
251. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
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iPhone dealers and naming AT&T as the exclusive service provider.252 In
addition, because the two parties entered into the agreement before the App
Store opened, the two parties maintain it does not include specific provisions
about applications for iPhones. 253 This does not imply that other agreements
do not exist, as both parties mention a covert mutual agreement that disal-
lows VoIP services and applications on the 3G network.2 54 AT&T claims
that it has conducted "general discussions" with Apple regarding issues relat-
ing to network management and congestion.255
While the record lacks direct evidence of an agreement to monopolize,
surrounding evidence sheds light on whether such an agreement exists. Per-
haps the most damaging evidence is Apple's inclusion of an AT&T applica-
tion that is strikingly similar to Google Voice. The application, AT&T
Virtual Receptionist,56 allows the consumer to create a new, personalized
toll-free number, show this new number on the receiving phone's caller ID
when making calls from an iPhone, custom call forwarding to up to three
other phones, and check voicemail directed to the new number using the
iPhone.257 Google Voice includes all these features, but Google Voice also
includes SMS text messaging features258 that AT&T Virtual Receptionist
lacks. Google Voice is entirely free259 while AT&T Virtual Receptionist
charges a recurring fee after the first 60 minutes.260 Both products use regu-
lar cell phone minutes when calling or receiving calls. Another difference
between the two applications is the way they place outbound calls. AT&T
Virtual Receptionist appears to use the iPhone contacts program, although
252. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 1.
253. AT&T Resp., supra note 189, at 11.
254. This agreement has now been nullified and AT&T allows VoIP applications,
such as Skype, to use the 3G network. Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Senior
Vice President, Fed. Regulatory, AT&T Services, Inc., to Ruth Milkman,
Chief, Wireless Telecomms. Bureau, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Proceeding
RM- 11361 (filed Oct. 6, 2009) available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/docu-
mentlview?id=7020040868 (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
255. AT&T Resp., supra note 189, at 5.
256. Id. at 13 (stating that it developed this application using the Apple SDK).
257. Apple App Store, AT&T Virtual Receptionist, available at http://
itunes.apple.com/us/app/at-t-virtual-receptionist/id3054652 17?mt=8 (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2010)
258. Google Resp., supra note 19, at 1.
259. John C. Dvorak, Google Voice: Free Calling Has Arrived, PCMag.com, Nov.
17, 2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2355955,00.asp (last visited
Nov. 3, 2010).
260. See AT&T Virtual Receptionist, supra note 257, see also AT&T Resp., supra
note 189, at 6-7.
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users can create a favorites list within AT&T Virtual Receptionist.61 Google
Voice dials directly from the iPhone while AT&T Virtual Receptionist places
a call to its Virtual Receptionist service, which then dials the recipient's
number.262 This feature might serve as the distinguishing factor between
Google Voice and AT&T Virtual Receptionist because Apple can argue that
Google Voice replaces the core user experience while AT&T Virtual Recep-
tionist does not. Google may counter this argument through data that demon-
strates Google Voice is more efficient than Apple and AT&T's combined
software, or by showing that Google also uses a similar relay service to route
calls.
Apple's approval of AT&T's Virtual Receptionist application while re-
jecting Google's application raises the issue of whether Apple and AT&T
have conspired to exclude Google from competing. Certainly Apple appears
to have sufficient reasons. Apple has spent years developing both the physi-
cal appearance and the user interface of the iPhone.263 In Apple's eyes, the
Google Voice application may be an attempt to take over the iPhone device
by means of a "Trojan Horse." Since Apple receives thirty percent of the
aftermarket application sales revenues,2 64 another reason for rejecting Google
Voice is because it would be offered for free. To the extent that Google
Voice is free, Apple would not receive any financial benefit by including the
application in the App Store. Google might argue that Google Voice en-
hances the core experience by adding functionality that does not exist out of
the box. Further, Google Voice does not disable the iPhone, nor does it af-
fect the retail price of the phone. Regardless of whether an application gen-
erates revenue for application purchases, a free application may encourage
new users to purchase an iPhone to take advantage of the application.
In its defense, Apple may argue that both Apple and AT&T have not
conspired to monopolize. Rather, the agreement between the parties is for
legitimate business purposes. One reason for the agreement is to ensure ap-
plications do not harm AT&T's network.265 This is a viable reason because
allowing applications that could potentially create congestion or bog down
the network is a disservice to all network users. Apple might also point out
that AT&T runs its own application service. The store, called AppCenter, is
261. AT&T Virtual Receptionist User Guide, http://mobile.ringcentral.com/sub-
domains/iphone/ATLVR userguide-v03.pdf, page 14 12 (last visited Nov.
23, 2010)
262. Id. at 13.
263. See Apple Resp., supra note 15, at I.
264. iPhone Developers Program - 3. Distribute Your Application, http://developer.
apple.com/iphone/programl/distribute.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (stating
that developers get to keep 70% of the revenue).
265. See Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 4-5.
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available to all AT&T phone service users.266 Even though AT&T is the
exclusive service provider for Apple's iPhones, iPhone users cannot
download material from the AppCenter.267 This fact is evidence against a
conspiracy between AT&T and Apple because it shows that Apple is not
favoring the other allegedly conspiring party. However, if Apple approves
all of AT&T's applications for the App Store, then this distinction is of no
consequence. As discussed, Apple virtually disclaimed any argument that it
denied Google Voice because of reasonable network management.
D. Foreclosure
AT&T and Apple's exclusive dealing agreement raises the question of
whether this agreement forecloses other potential competitors from entering
the market. In general, the mere existence of an exclusive dealing contract
does not trigger a violation of U.S. antitrust laws.268 Under the rule of rea-
son, exclusive dealing contracts are not prohibited by U.S antitrust laws un-
less the result is a foreclosure of market alternatives.269 Exclusive dealing
contracts are illegal under very limited circumstances. Such instances in-
clude proof of substantial market foreclosure, injury to competition, or spe-
cific intent to fix prices or destroy competition.270
The exclusive dealing contract between AT&T and Apple relates to the
phone and data service for the iPhone. The contract does not name AT&T as
the exclusive provider of applications available for the iPhone in the App
Store. Certainly Google cannot argue that AT&T has substantially fore-
closed it from creating applications for the App Store because Apple has not
imposed a complete prohibition on all Google applications. Apple offers at
least two applications in the App Store: Google Earth and Google Mobile
application. This shows that the exclusive dealing contract between Apple
and AT&T is for wireless service and does not extend to applications. Ef-
fects on wireless service, however, may influence Apple's approval of appli-
cations if they cause network harm.
266. AT&T AppCenter, https://appcenter.wireless.att.com (last visited Nov. 3,
2010).
267. On the AppCenter webpage, AT&T provides a list of the cell phone manufac-
turers. Apple is not listed as a manufacturer and the site does not provide any
applications available for download to an iPhone.
268. E. Food Servs., Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass'n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1,
4-5 (1 st Cir. 2004).
269. CDC Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1999).
270. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 328 (1961) (addressing
substantial market foreclosure); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 11-12 (1984) (addressing restraint of horizontal competition); Ap-
palachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 376 (1940) (addressing intent
to fix prices); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 627
(1953) (addressing intent to destroy competition).
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E. Tying
Apple's requirement that all applications for the iPhone must be
downloaded from the App Store raises the question of whether this policy is
illegal tying. Under U.S. antitrust laws, tying exists when the accused party
has economic power over the tying market.271 To be unlawful tying, the
seller must possess market power in the tying product; monopoly power in
the tying product is not required.272 Economic power in the tying market can
be supported by allegations showing either that the seller of the tying product
has a large enough share of the relevant market in that product to give the
seller some power over the market, or that the tying product is so unique or
desirable as to give the seller of that product an advantage over other compet-
itors in the market.273 Section III provides an analysis of Apple's market
power.274
Two types of tying exist: conventional tying and negative tying. Con-
ventional tying exists when one product is sold on the condition that the
purchaser also purchases a second product.275 For illustrative purposes, con-
sider a consumer looking to purchase a high-end bread maker. A seller of-
fers to sell the bread maker on the condition that the purchaser also purchases
flour from the seller. The requirement to buy flour from the seller is tying.
The product the consumer wishes to purchase, the bread maker in this exam-
ple, is called the tying product. The second product, the flour, is called the
tied product because it is tied to the first.
In contrast, a negative tying arrangement is an agreement to sell a prod-
uct on the condition that the purchaser agrees not to purchase the second
product from any other seller or supplier.276 Using the bread maker analogy
above, instead of requiring the purchaser to buy flour from the seller, the
seller imposes a condition that the buyer will not purchase flour from any
supplier other than the seller. Effectively, this type of negative tying renders
the tying product useless unless the purchaser also purchases the tied
product.
271. Baxley-DeLamar Monuments, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass'n, 843 F.2d 1154,
1156-57 (8th Cir. 1988).
272. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
273. Baxley-DeLamar, 843 F.2d at 1156-57.
274. See supra Part III.
275. Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24, 25 (1957); Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. & Standard Stations v. United States., 337 U.S. 293, 305-306 (1949);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948); Int'l Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1947); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneap-
olis Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
276. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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The first step in analyzing whether tying exists is determining the tied
product and the tying product.277 The tying product is generally the product
the consumer seeks and the tied product is one that the consumer is forced to
purchase.278
Here, the iPhone is the tying product. The iPhone has a number of fea-
tures that attract consumers. First the iPhone is much thinner than most of its
competitors. In addition, the iPhone has a large hard drive and doubles as an
mp3 player, obviating the need to carry around both a phone and an mp3
player. Many consumers may seek the status of owning an iPhone279 or to
have access to more than 250,000 applications available in the App Store.280
Alternatively, users may be more inclined to select a phone based on a
few important or critical applications, than to select a phone that will run the
desired applications, as discussed above. For instance, the Google Voice ap-
plication is available for Blackberry mobile devices. If the most important
aspect is the ability to use Google Voice on a mobile device, users are free to
choose a Blackberry or Android-based device. While this scenario is possi-
ble, it is probably limited to a narrow group of individuals and thus the the-
ory is not generally applicable. Consumers are more likely to choose a
phone and use the available applications rather than choose any phone that
runs a specific application. Thus, the tying product is the iPhone and the tied
products are the applications in the App Store.
Since Apple does not require users to purchase apps from the App Store,
the App Store looks more like negative tying. Should an iPhone user wish to
download and install an application for their iPhone, Apple forces the user to
purchase from the App Store only. However, Apple allows its competitors to
submit applications to the App Store and approves most of them. Although
Apple may decide not to approve an application based on its sole discretion
and unclear guidelines,281 as discussed earlier,282 Apple has approved at least
two of Google's applications, which are for sale in the App Store. Consider-
ing all these factors, Apple's mandate that all applications must be
downloaded from the App Store is not illegal tying.
277. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462-63
(1992).
278. Id.
279. Mark Milian, Apple removes $1,000 featureless iPhone application, L. A.
TiMES, Aug. 7, 2008, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/
2008/08/iphone-i-am-ric.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
280. Apple iPhone Gallery - TV Ads, supra note 1.
281. See Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 1-2.
282. See Google Resp., supra note 19, at 4.
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VI. How THE FCC SHOULD ANALYZE THE GOOGLE VOICE
PETITION REGARDING THE IPHONE
As noted earlier,283 the FCC should take antitrust laws and potential
antitrust violations into account during the inquiry process when analyzing
Apple's alleged rejection of the Google Voice application. Recognizing anti-
trust issues is helpful when analyzing conduct under Section 1 of the Com-
munications Act. The FCC is also responsible for ensuring that
communication systems in the United States are organized in such a way that
they serve the interests of the people.284 In some instances, the public interest
standard may clash with the antitrust laws.285 If this happens, the FCC's duty
to ensure that public interests are best served supersedes antitrust enforce-
ment.286 For example, the FCC has allowed large firms to gain significant
monopolies provided that the merging firms consent to regulations that serve
the public interest.287
The Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of
1996 provide the FCC with statutory authority to regulate the communica-
tions industry. Under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, all
practices in connection with communication service "shall be just and rea-
sonable, and any ... practice ... that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to
be unlawful."288 Section 202(a) further provides that.any carrier that engages
in "any unjust or unreasonable discrimination" practices in connection with
the communications industry through "unreasonable preference or advan-
tage" violates the Communications Act.289
283. See supra note 24.
284. The Benton Foundation: The Public Interest Standard in Television Broadcast-
ing, http://www.benton.org/initiatives/obligations/charting-the digital-broad
castingjuture/sec2 (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). Examples of policies that serve
the public interest include: fostering diversity of programming, ensuring electo-
ral candidates access to the airwaves, providing diverse views on public issues,
encouraging news and public affairs programming, promoting localism, devel-
oping quality programming for children, and sustaining a separate realm of
high-quality, noncommercial television programming.
285. Maurice E. Stucke, Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and The Marketplace of Ideas,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 287-95 (2001).
286. Id. at 292 (the FCC has a duty to enforce the Telecommunications Act under
the public interest standard).
287. See AT&T Mergers; In re Review of AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp Applica-
tion For Consent to Transfer of Control, WC Docket No. 06-74, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5662 (2007).
288. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2008).
289. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2008).
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The exemplary case of Carterfone sheds light on how the FCC should
rule on Apple's alleged rejection of the Google Voice application.290 Though
based in part on AT&T's monopoly over the wireline network, the factors
considered and principles established in Carterfone equally apply to a mo-
nopoly over the wireless network.91 In Carterfone, the FCC found that a
practice and tariff that prevented a third party device from connecting to the
telephone network violated the Communications Act.292 If a consumer
wishes to "improve the utility [of the telephone system] to him . . .[he]
should be able to do so, so long as the interconnection does not adversely
affect the telephone company's operations or the telephone system's util-
ity."293 The FCC looked at several factors in reaching this holding: (1) the
"nature and extent of the public need and demand" for the use of the
Carterfone device;94 (2) the effects the device had on the telephone system
providing the message service and the public when using the device;295 and
(3) whether prohibition of the Carterfone device violated Sections 201(b) and
202(a) of the Communications Act of 1934.296
In reviewing the examiner's findings, the Commission agreed that the
device filled a need and does not adversely affect the telephone system.29 7
The FCC held that prohibiting "a customer supplied 'foreign attachment' was
'an unwarranted interference with the telephone subscriber's right reasonably
to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being
publicly detrimental,' "298 and AT&T's barring of the Carterfone device was
"unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful."299 Similar to the Carterfone
device, the Google Voice application attaches to the iPhone and interfaces
with AT&T's networks. Demand for this device has led at least three individ-
uals to submit letters to the FCC protesting Apple's denial of the Google
Voice application iPhone users. 300 A plethora of websites and bloggers have
290. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968) [hereinafter Carterfone].
291. See Sandoval, supra note 47 at 710, n.419; see also Tim Wu, Wireless
Carterfone, I INT'L J. COMM. 389, 417 (2007) available at http://ijoc.org/ojs/
index.php/ijoc/article/viewfile/152/96 (explaining why policies set forth in
Carterfone should apply to wireless networks).
292. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 423.
293. Id. at 424.
294. Id. at 421.
295. Id. at 421-22.
296. Id. at 422.
297. Id. at 423-24.
298. Id. at 423 (quoting Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266, 269
(D.C. Cir. 1956)).
299. Id. at 423.
300. Nuyujukian, supra note 221; Anderson, supra note 223.
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also posted frustrations with Apple's alleged denial.301 These public state-
ments of concern evidence the high consumer demand for Google Voice on
the iPhone and public disappointment of the alleged rejection.
AT&T argued in Carterfone that in order to provide effective service to
the public, telephone companies "must have absolute control over the qual-
ity, installation, and maintenance of all parts of the system."302 Even after all
these years, AT&T's argument carries the same tune: AT&T is still con-
cerned about providing "a satisfactory experience for end-user customers." 303
However, neither Apple nor AT&T has produced any evidence that Google
Voice creates network harm that jeopardizes a consumer's satisfactory expe-
rience. In fact, "AT&T does not disable access to or use of [the Google
Voice] application" on other devices using its network.304 Arguably, AT&T
may not have investigated the Google Voice application at the outset of the
FCC's investigation because it is "typically not consulted regarding the ap-
proval or rejection of applications for the App Store," though AT&T has
consulted with Apple in the past regarding applications that might cause net-
work harm.305 However, at this juncture, AT&T has had sufficient time and
notice to make such a determination. The only argument Apple advances
against the Google Voice application is that it degrades the "core experience"
of the iPhone by providing alternative means for placing calls and accessing
contacts. 306
Further, the FCC should consider whether the AT&T and Apple prohi-
bition of the Google voice application constitutes unlawful discrimination
under Section 202(a) of the Communications Act.307 In Carterfone, the court
found that AT&T discriminated against the Carterfone device by allowing a
similar device run by AT&T to connect to its telephone system, essentially
301. See, e.g., Sam Diaz, The Google Voice app scandal: is Apple losing control
over the iPhone?, ZDNET, Aug. 24, 2009, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=23
096; Saul Hansell, Apple Denies It Rejected Google Application for iPhone,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/22/technology/
companies/22apple.html?_r=-l; Robert G. Hansen, Google Voice, Apple and
AT', ROBERT HANSEN'S BLOG, Aug. 21, 2009, http://robertghansen.blogspot.
com/2009/08/google-voice-apple-and-att.html; Chris Foresman, FCC probes
Google Voice rejection, AT&T denies involvement, ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 3,
2009, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2009/O8/fcc-probes-google-voice-re-
jection-att-denies-involvement.ars ("Even having a seat (at least until recently)
on Apple's board wasn't enough to get Google Voice approved").
302. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 424.
303. AT&T Resp., supra note 189, at 5.
304. Id. at 16.
305. Id. at 1.
306. Id. at 1-2.
307. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a).
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providing itself with an advantage. 308 The facts of the present case are simi-
lar. Here, Apple is conferring a benefit on AT&T by approving and selling
the AT&T Virtual Receptionist application in the App Store while prohibit-
ing the sale of the Google Voice application, which offers the same services.
Regardless of whether this amounts to an antitrust conspiracy, 309 the spirit of
the Carterfone holding prohibits this type of conduct on the basis of the pub-
lic interest standard.310
Apple has monopoly power over the iPhone application aftermarket311
and it has tied the iPhone and wireless service to the aftermarket applica-
tions.312 The decision of whether it is desirable to store and access contacts
locally on the device or remotely from a server should be left to the con-
sumer. Apple's prohibition of the Google Voice application amounts to tell-
ing the consumer what is best, an unreasonable practice that violates Section
201(b) of the Communications Act.
VII. CONSIDERATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE NOTICE
OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING
A recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from the FCC invites com-
ments on six proposed rules to handle net neutrality issues, three of which are
of concern to the issue addressed in this Article.313 First, in considering the
proposed rules, the FCC should ensure that the provision protecting a "user's
entitlement to competition among application providers" is not interpreted by
firms to mean application developers.3,4 For example, competition should
not mean that developers create competition for approval to the App Store
because Apple has the final say on what applications it approves. Allowing
Apple to restrict this type of competition hurts the public because it results in
fewer mobile device applications available to the consumer.
Second, the FCC should ensure that mobile device manufacturers and
application developers are prohibited from claiming the "network manage-
ment" defense because manufacturers and developers are not service provid-
ers. Apple attempts to expand the reasonable network management defense
to include the users' core experience when using a device.3 15 However, this
argument has nothing to do with causing harm or degrading the overall user
308. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 423.
309. See supra Part V.3.
310. See Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 423-24.
311. See supra Part V.A.
312. See supra Part V.E.
313. Commission Seeks Public Input On Draft Rules To Preserve The Free And
Open Internet, 74 Fed. Reg. 62638 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
314. Id.
315. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at 2.
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experience of the network; in fact, the successful use of the same Google
Voice application on Blackberry or Android-based devices demonstrates the
opposite.
Third, the FCC should encourage transparency by requiring a company
to justify any limitations on products or services imposed under the guise of
reasonable network management by providing the consumer notice in clear
terms and conditions.316 No amount of disclosure or warning is sufficient to
justify anticompetitive or exclusionary limitations. Blanket statements that
attempt to justify engaging in exclusionary conduct to maintain the "integ-
rity" of its products or services will not hold up in court.317 Consumers
should not have to trust a service provider's word that a limitation in place is
justified. To be sure, Apple and AT&T do have an interest in preventing
network congestion and upholding the integrity of their products, but this
interest does not grant Apple a license to capriciously deny applications be-
cause they do not fit within Apple's idea of a user's core experience.
Finally, the FCC should also consider an analogy to the first-sale doc-
trine or exhaustion rule,318 an established legal concept embraced by U.S.
copyright law319 and patent law.320 Under the first sale doctrine, a seller may
not exercise control of a product after an authorized sale to another party. 32'
When a consumer purchases a product, the consumer also pays for the free-
dom to use the product in any way they see fit. A legal purchase of an
iPhone includes a valid transfer of all rights of ownership of that device from
Apple to the consumer. Under the first sale doctrine, this transfer should
prohibit Apple from reaching beyond the sale and meddling with a pur-
chaser's personal decision of how she desires to use the iPhone. For exam-
ple, purchase of an iPhone should include the ability to download, install, and
use any application of their choosing, so long as that application does not
cause network harm.322 iPhone owners should even have the ability to unin-
stall the included operating system completely in favor of a different operat-
ing system, such as Microsoft's Windows Mobile or Google's Android. The
first sale doctrine should also allow consumers the freedom to switch wire-
316. 74 Fed. Reg. 62638 at E.
317. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 54; supra note 142.
318. Cases involving licensed products are treated differently because the consumer
never acquires actual ownership. See e.g., United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d
1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1977); MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991
F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993). Because Apple sells iPhones rather than merely
license their use, these cases are inapplicable and will not be discussed.
319. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (codified in the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2009)).
320. See Quanta v. LG Elec., 553 U.S. 617, 628 (2008) (establishing that patent
enforcement is restricted following the sale of an item).
321. 17 U.S.C. § 109; Quanta, 553 U.S. at 628.
322. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 424.
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less service providers with no penalty costs or fees because controlling the
provider overreaches the original sale and unreasonably interferes with his
personal decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Apple's current practices force iPhone owners that wish to use Google
Voice to breach the service contract with AT&T. Currently, the only way to
use the Google Voice application on an iPhone is by "jail breaking" the
iPhone.323 Jail breaking allows users to install applications not included in
Apple's App Store.324 However, jail breaking voids the user's existing ser-
vice contract with AT&T. A user's preference for a mobile application is her
prerogative and she should not be forced to choose between voiding the ser-
vice contract or going without. Instead, Apple should make the Google
Voice application available to all iPhone users through its App Store because
denying its use runs afoul of Apple's goal to "provide [its] customers with
the best possible user experience."325
323. iPhoneChris, How to Jailbreak Your iPhone in Under a Minute, Ap-
pleiPhoneReview, Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.appleiphonereview.com/iphone-
tutorials/iphone-jailbreak/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
324. Id.
325. Apple Resp., supra note 15, at I.
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